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Abstract
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a
coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are
considered is the one of games with coalition structure of Aumann and Drèze (1974). They
assumed that the player set is partitioned into unions and that players can only cooperate
within their own union. Owen (1977) introduced a value for games with coalition structure
under the assumption that also the unions can cooperate among them. Winter (1989)
extended this value to games with levels structure of cooperation, which consists of a game
and a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser
than the previous one.
A share function for TU-games is a type of solution that assigns to every game a vector
whose components add up to one, and thus they can be interpreted as players’ shares in the
worth to be allocated. Extending the approach to games with coalition structure developed
in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005), we introduce a class of share functions for games
with levels structure of cooperation by defining, for each player and each level, a standard
TU-game. The share given to each player is then defined as the product of her shares
in the games at every level. We show several desirable properties and provide axiomatic
characterizations of this class of LS-share functions.
∗Corresponding author’s e-mail address: toriol@ethz.ch.
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a finite set of players N
and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoff that the coalition
can obtain by cooperating. A value function for TU-games is a function that assigns to every
TU-game with n players an n-dimensional vector representing a distribution of payoffs among
the players. A value function is efficient if for every game it distributes exactly the worth of the
‘grand coalition’, N , over all players. The most famous efficient value function is the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953). An example of a value function that is not efficient is the Banzhaf value
(Banzhaf, 1965; Owen, 1975; Dubey and Shapley, 1979). Since the Banzhaf value is not efficient
it is not adequate in allocating the worth v(N). In order to allocate v(N) according to the
Banzhaf value, van den Brink and van der Laan (1998) characterize the normalized Banzhaf
value, which distributes the worth v(N) proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players.
A different approach to efficiently allocate the worth v(N) is described in van der Laan
and van den Brink (1998), who introduce share functions as an alternative type of solution
for TU-games. A share vector for an n-player game is an n-dimensional real vector whose
components add up to one. The ith component is player i’s share in the total payoff that is
to be distributed among the players. A share function assigns such a share vector to every
game. The share function corresponding to the Shapley value is the Shapley share function,
which is obtained by dividing the Shapley value of each player by v(N), i.e., by the sum of the
Shapley values of all players. Similarly, the Banzhaf share function is obtained by dividing the
Banzhaf –or normalized Banzhaf– value by the corresponding sum of payoffs over all players.
One advantage of share functions over value functions is that share functions avoid the “efficiency
issue”, i.e., they avoid the question of what is the final worth to be distributed over the players.
This yields some major simplifications. For example, although the Banzhaf and normalized
Banzhaf value are very different value functions (e.g. the Banzhaf value satisfies linearity and
the dummy player property which are not satisfied by the normalized Banzhaf value), they
correspond to the same Banzhaf share function. Another main advantage of share functions
has been discovered by Pekec (2001), who shows that on a ratio scale meaningful statements
can be made for a certain class of share functions, whereas all statements with respect to value
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functions are meaningless.1
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N is a fea-
sible coalition and can earn its worth. However, there are many real life situations in which
cooperation is restricted, e.g. there is a priori information about the behavior of the players or
only partial cooperation is possible due to environmental restrictions. The games with coalition
structure proposed in Aumann and Drèze (1974) are among the first models in which restrictions
in cooperation are considered. They assume that the player set is partitioned and that players
can only cooperate with other players that belong to the same element of the partition. Such
a partition is called a coalition structure and the elements of the coalition structure are called
unions. Owen (1977) allows that a subset of players within a union can also cooperate with
players of other unions, but only if all players of the other unions agree. His proposed value,
known as the Owen value, can be introduced in several ways. We can define an external game
or quotient game as a game where the unions form the player set, and the worth of a coalition
of unions simply equals the worth of that ‘union of unions’ in the original game. Then, for every
union, an internal game is defined where the worth of every subset of players within that union
equals the Shapley value of that subset in the modified quotient game obtained by replacing that
union by the specific subset. Taking the Shapley value of this internal game yields the Owen
value of the game with coalition structure. This value satisfies the (consistency) property that
the sum of the payoffs assigned to the players in a particular union equals the Shapley value of
that union in the quotient game.
A straightforward example shows that the existence of a coalition structure might have a
significant impact on the outcome. Suppose that, in a simple majority voting game, the coalition
structure consists of two unions of players. If the two unions have not the same number of votes,
then, by definition of the voting game, one of the unions has the majority. Ignoring the coalition
structure, we might apply the Shapley value and typically this results in an outcome in which
every player is assigned a positive payoff (power). Taking into account the coalition structure,
the Owen value assigns the full worth of the grand coalition, v(N) = 1, to the players of the
majority coalition and, thus, all players in the minority coalition get zero payoff.
Similar insights might be obtained in situations with more complex restrictions to the
cooperation among players. In Courtin (2011) the distribution of power in the European Par-
liament is analyzed when the a priori information that limits the cooperation among parties can
1A statement for a TU-game is meaningful on a ratio scale if the statement is also true if we multiply the
relevant variables by the same constant, see Pekec (2001).
3
be represented by two arbitrary partitions of the set of parties, that respond respectively to an
economic and a political criterion. Whereas the Aumann-Drèze coalition structure is a partition
of the grand coalition, in the model of Courtin (2011) the resulting coalition structure is a collec-
tion of unions with possibly non-empty intersection. These games, with the so-called coalition
configuration structure, are introduced in Albizuri et al. (2006) and Albizuri and Aurrekoetxea
(2006).
In this paper we consider a different structure that restricts the cooperation possibilities
among the agents. To illustrate the validity of the model, we briefly discuss its possible appli-
cation to the European Parliament. This chamber is, together with the “Council of Ministers”
and the “European Commission”, one of the main European political institutions. It consists of
754 delegates from 27 different countries. Members of each country are organized within na-
tional parties, and parties from different countries are organized in seven parliamentary groups.
The three largest groups are the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, and
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats. Some of these groups are further divided into (for-
mal) smaller subgroups, e.g. the latter Alliance consists of two subgroups: the Liberals and the
Democrats. Moreover, it might also happen that on particular issues other (informal) subgroups
are formed, e.g. according to geographical proximity among national parties. Considering the
structure from top to down, we observe that first there is a coalition structure consisting of the
seven parliamentary groups. Then, within such a group there is a second coalition structure
consisting of the subgroups. Next, within each subgroup there is again a coalition structure
consisting of national parties. To study the power of an individual member of the parliament it
seems necessary to take into account this organizational structure.
Games with such a structure have been considered in Winter (1989), who extends games
with coalition structure to the so-called games with levels structure of cooperation. This model
consists of a game and a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them
being coarser than the previous one. Considering the ‘highest’ level as a coalition structure,
each union is again partitioned so that players within a union in this next level are somehow
closer to each other than to other players in the union, who are still closer than players outside
the union in the highest level. Again, this partition of the unions can be partitioned further,
and so on and so forth. For this model Winter (1989) suggests a solution that generalizes the
Owen value for games with coalition structure, and thus also generalizes the Shapley value
for standard TU-games. Recently, Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2011) defined an extension of
the (non efficient) Banzhaf value for games with levels structure of cooperation, and provided
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comparable axiomatizations of this value and Winter’s Shapley type value.
In van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) it is shown that share functions have addi-
tional desirable properties when applying them to games with coalition structure. For every
element in the class of share functions mentioned above, they defined a share function for games
with coalition structure, taking for every player the product of her share in the internal game
and the share of her union in the external (quotient) game. These share functions satisfy the
consistency property that the sum of the shares over players in one union equals the share of
the union in the quotient game. Applying the Shapley share function twice yields the Owen
value (after multiplying by v(N)). However, applying the Banzhaf share function twice2 yields
a different solution than the Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure considered in
Owen (1981). In van den Brink and van der Laan (2005), see also Andjiga and Courtin (2010),
two axiomatizations of such a class of share functions are given, one using the multiplication
property, and another one using the consistency property relating the payoffs of players within
a union to the payoff of the union in the quotient game.
The results of van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) show that taking the product of
two shares is a natural method to define solutions for games with coalition structure. In this
paper we extend this argument to games with levels structure of cooperation. We introduce a
class of LS-share functions by defining a standard TU-game for every union at every level, and
then assigning to every player the product of her shares over the corresponding games at every
level.
We show several desirable properties of these solutions. Two fundamental properties are
(i) they yield the corresponding solution for standard TU-games in case the levels structure is
trivial (meaning that the grand coalition N is partitioned immediately in a coalition structure
consisting of all singletons of N), and (ii) the sum of the shares of the players in a union
equals the share of the union in the game played among the unions of this level (consistency).
We provide axiomatizations of these share functions, extending those that are known for games
with coalition structure. Moreover, we use weaker versions of some of the axioms used for games
with coalition structure by requiring them only for trivial structures. Besides generalizing those
two axiomatizations, we introduce a new type of axiom which we refer to as µ-fairness.
The class of LS-share functions introduced in this paper is parametrized by real valued
µ-functions on the set of TU-games. These functions are introduced in van der Laan and van
den Brink (1998). The first result of this paper characterizes the class of µ-functions that are
2Recall that the Banzhaf value and normalized Banzhaf value yield the same Banzhaf share function.
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positive, symmetric, and additive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries on TU-games. In Sec-
tion 3 we review share functions and present the result which characterizes all positive, additive,
and symmetric µ-functions, and the corresponding share functions for TU-games. In Section 4
we introduce the class of LS-share functions for games with levels structure of cooperation, we
derive the first properties, and we give special attention to the Shapley levels share function.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide the axiomatic characterizations.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of players
and v, the characteristic function, is a real valued function on 2N = {S : S ⊆ N} with v(∅) = 0.
Along the paper we use the | · | operator to denote the cardinality of a finite set, i.e., |S| is
the number of players in S, for any S ⊆ N . Alternatively, sometimes we use lowercase letters
to denote cardinalities, and thus s = |S| for any S ⊆ N . A game (N, v) is called monotone
if for every S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T , it holds that v(S) ≤ v(T ). That is, monotone games are
those in which the cooperation among players is never pernicious. Notice that the class of
monotone games is a quite wide class of games. We denote by G the set of all monotone games.
Since the whole paper deals with monotone games, henceforth we will simply say game instead
of monotone game. For an arbitrary finite set K, we denote by RK to the |K|-dimensional
Euclidean space with elements x ∈ RK having components xi, i ∈ K.
For each S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , we will write S ∪ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S \ i instead of
S \ {i}. For a pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G, the game (N, z) with z = v + w is defined by
z(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N . We denote by (N, v0) the null game with player set N , i.e.,
v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . For every nonempty T ⊆ N and (N, v) ∈ G, we denote by (T, v|T ) the
subgame on T given by v|T (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . Further, given S ∈ 2N , the unanimity game
with carrier S, (N, uS), is defined by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T , and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. Notice
that (N, uS) ∈ G for every S ∈ 2N .
Given (N, v) ∈ G, a player i ∈ N is a dummy if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for all S ⊆ N \ i,
that is, if all her marginal contributions are equal to v(i). A player i ∈ N is called a null player
if she is a dummy and v(i) = 0. Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric if v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j) for
all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, that is, if their marginal contributions to each coalition coincide.
A value function, or shortly value, on G is a map f that assigns to every game (N, v) ∈ G
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a vector f(N, v) ∈ RN . The following definitions provide the explicit expressions of two well-
known values in the literature.
Definition 2.1. (Shapley, 1953)
The Shapley value, Sh, assigns to any game (N, v), a vector in RN defined as
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , i ∈ N.
Definition 2.2. (Banzhaf, 1965; Owen, 1975)
The Banzhaf value, Ba, assigns to any game (N, v) a vector in RN defined as
Bai(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
1
2n−1
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , i ∈ N.
By a share function we mean a map ρ that assigns to every game (N, v) ∈ G a vector
ρ(N, v) ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N ρi(N, v) = 1. The component ρi(N, v) represents player i’s share
in the worth to be distributed. Consequently, a share function ρmay be obtained from each value
f on G by defining for every (N, v) ∈ G and every player i ∈ N its share ρi(N, v) = fi(N,v)∑
j∈N fj(N,v)
.
In the next definition the share functions obtained from Sh and Ba are presented.
Definition 2.3.
(i) Given a game (N, v) ∈ G, the Shapley share function, ρSh, assigns to any game (N, v) a vector
in RN defined as ρShi (N, v) =
Shi(N,v)
v(N) , i ∈ N , if v 6= v0, and ρShi (N, v0) = 1|N | , i ∈ N .
(ii) Given a game (N, v) ∈ G, the Banzhaf share function, ρBa, assigns to any game (N, v)
a vector in RN defined as ρBai (N, v) =
Bai(N,v)∑
j∈N Baj(N,v)
, i ∈ N , if v 6= v0, and ρBai (N, v0) = 1|N | ,
i ∈ N .
3 Share functions
In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) a class of share functions for TU-games is defined
and characterized based on real valued functions µ : G −→ R. The Shapley and Banzhaf share
functions are included in this class for appropriate choices of µ-functions. In this section we
reconsider and extend the results of van der Laan and van den Brink (1998). In Subsection
3.1 we propose a set of properties for µ-functions that will allow us to write them as a sum of
weighted marginal contributions where the weights are of a certain type. In Subsection 3.2 we
merge the aforesaid result with the characterization of van der Laan and van den Brink (1998).
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3.1 Real valued functions on G
We consider some properties that real valued functions on G, µ : G → R, might satisfy. By G0
we denote the class of null games (N, v0), and by G+ = G \ G0 the class of non-null games. Let
Π(N) denote the set of all permutations of N and, for any pi ∈ Π(N) and (N, v) ∈ G, define the
game (N, piv) where (piv)(T ) = v(pi(T )) for all T ⊆ N . We say that
(a) µ is positive if µ(N, v0) = 0 and µ(N, v) > 0 for every (N, v) ∈ G+.
(b) µ is additive if for every pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G, it holds that µ(N, v + w) =
µ(N, v) + µ(N,w).
(c) µ is symmetric if for every pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N in (N, v) ∈ G and every
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, it holds that µ(S ∪ i, v|S∪i) = µ(S ∪ j, v|S∪j).
(d) µ is anonymous if, for every game (N, v) ∈ G, every permutation pi ∈ Π(N), and every
nonempty subset S ⊆ N , it holds that µ(S, v|S) = µ(pi(S), (pi−1v)|pi(S)).
In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) the first two properties are used to define a
family of µ-functions on a fixed player set. It is there proved that a certain characterization
result for share functions, which makes use of a property called µ-additivity, holds as long as
µ is positive, additive, and anonymous3. In van den Brink and van der Laan (1999) their
result is extended to a variable player set using symmetry instead of anonymity. Nevertheless,
the formulation of anonymity seems to be a more natural way of requiring that the identity of
players does not play a role. In the Appendix (see Proposition 6.1) it is shown that symmetry and
anonymity are in fact equivalent properties. This implies that, although we use the anonymity
formulation henceforth, we are actually considering exactly the same class of functions as in van
der Laan and van den Brink (1998) for a fixed player set.
We next show that, except for the equivalence between symmetry and anonymity, there
is no logical relation among the above properties.
Proposition 3.1. Additivity, positivity, and anonymity are independent properties.
Proof. First, µ(N, v) = v(N)2 satisfies positivity and anonymity but not additivity.
Second, µ(N, v) = −v(N) satisfies additivity and anonymity but not positivity. Third, take a
3The necessity for anonymity is mentioned in Theorem 25 and Footnote 6 in van den Brink and van der Laan
(1999).
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particular player j and define µ as
µ(N, v) =
2v(N) if j ∈ N,v(N) otherwise.
Then µ satisfies additivity and positivity but not anonymity. 
The following result shows that any real valued function µ that is positive, additive, and
anonymous can be written as a linear combination of marginal contributions with the weights
depending only on the sizes of the corresponding coalitions.
Theorem 3.2. Let µ be a real valued function on G. Then, the two following statements are
equivalent:
(a) µ is positive, additive, and anonymous.
(b) There is a unique family of strictly positive weights, {ωn,sµ ∈ R : n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−
1}} such that, for every (N, v) ∈ G,
µ(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\i
ω|N |,|S|µ [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] . (1)
Proof. We first prove the implication (b) =⇒ (a). First, since the weights are strictly
positive and the games in G are monotone, µ is positive. Second, since µ(N, v), as defined in
eq. (1), is linear on each v(S), S ⊆ N , µ is additive. Third, since the weights depend only on
the cardinality of the sets, µ(N, v) is anonymous.
Next we prove the implication (a) =⇒ (b). Let N and µ : G −→ R be fixed. We denote
by GN the set of games with the fixed player set N . It is well known that GN is a cone in
the euclidean space of dimension 2n − 1. As a consequence, µ can be cast as the restriction of
a map µ∗ : R2n−1 −→ R. Moreover, observe that GN has positive measure in R2n−1 because
{(N, uS)}∅6=S⊆N is a basis of R2n−1 and for every S ⊆ N , (N, uS) ∈ G. Therefore, since µ
is positive, µ∗ is bounded from below in a set of positive measure. From the solution of the
Cauchy equation for several variables applied to µ (see Proposition 1 at page 35 in Aczél and
Dhombres (1989) for instance), for every ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , there are scalars aS ∈ R, such that, for all
(N, v) ∈ GN ,
µ(N, v) = µ∗(N, v) =
∑
∅6=S⊆N
aSv(S).
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Note that the argument above applies for any given µ and N . Hence, for every positive, additive,
and anonymous µ, every finite set of players N , and every coalition ∅ 6= S ⊆ N there are scalars
aN,Sµ such that, for every (N, v) ∈ G,
µ(N, v) =
∑
∅6=S⊆N
aN,Sµ v(S). (2)
Next, let N and N ′ be two sets of players, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , and S′ ⊆ N ′ such that |S| = |S′|.
Let pi ∈ Π(N ∪N ′) be a permutation that exchanges S with S′ and N with N ′. By anonymity,
µ(N, uS|N ) = µ(pi(N), (pi
−1uS)|Π(N)) = µ(N ′, uS
′
|N ′). (3)
We prove that aN,Sµ = aN
′,S′
µ by reverse induction on the cardinality of S.
Let S = N and S′ = N ′. Then, we have that aN
′,N ′
µ = µ(N
′, uN
′
|N′ ) = µ(N, u
N
|N ) = a
N,N
µ ,
where the first and last equality follow from eq. (2) and the second equality from eq. (3). Next,
for some s < n, T ⊆ N and T ′ ⊆ N ′, assume that aN,Tµ = aN
′,T ′
µ whenever |T | = |T ′| > s. Take
S ( N and S′ ( N ′ with |S| = |S′| = s > 0. By eq. (2) and eq. (3),
aN
′,S′
µ +
∑
{T ′⊆N ′|S′(T ′}
aN
′,T ′
µ =
∑
{T ′⊆N ′|S′⊆T ′}
aN
′,T ′
µ =
∑
{T⊆N |S⊆T}
aN,Tµ = a
N,S
µ +
∑
{T⊆N |S(T}
aN,Tµ .
(4)
By the induction hypothesis we have that for every T ′ ⊆ N ′ with S′ ( T ′ and every T ⊆ N
with S ( T such that |S| = |S′|, aN ′,T ′µ = aN,Tµ . Thus, eq. (4) leads to aN,Sµ = aN
′,S′
µ . Thus,
there exist numbers an,sµ , with n ∈ IN and s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that, for every (N, v) ∈ G,
µ(N, v) =
∑
∅6=S⊆N
an,sµ v(S). (5)
Analogously to Corollary 3.8 of van der Laan and van den Brink (1998), for every n ∈ N
and s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, we recursively define the parameters wn,sµ , by ωn,n−1µ = 1nan,nµ , and
ωn,s = 1s+1
(
an,s+1µ + (n− s− 1)ωn,s+1µ
)
for all s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}. Then, we can rewrite eq. (5)
as
µ(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\i
ωn,sµ [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] . (6)
Hence, we have proved the existence of a family of weights, {ωn,sµ ∈ R : n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1}} such that eq. (6) holds for every (N, v) ∈ G.
To prove the uniqueness of the weights, let {ωn,sµ }n∈N,s∈{0,...,n−1} and {δn,sµ }n∈N,s∈{0,...,n−1}
be two systems of weights that satisfy eq. (6). For each n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let
(N, vs) ∈ G with |N | = n be defined by vs(T ) = 1 if |T | > s and vs(T ) = 0 otherwise. Then,
0 = µ(N, vs)− µ(N, vs) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\i
(ωn,|S|µ − δn,|S|µ ) [vs(S ∪ i)− vs(S)] = (ωn,sµ − δn,sµ ) · n ·
(
n− 1
s
)
,
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which implies that ωn,sµ = δn,sµ for any n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Hence, the system of
weights is unique.
Finally, to prove that the weights are positive, notice that the game (N, vs) ∈ G is not a
null game. Therefore,
0 < µ(N, vs) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\i
ωn,|S|µ [v
s(S ∪ i)− vs(S)] = ωn,sµ · n ·
(
n− 1
s
)
,
which implies that ωn,sµ > 0 for any n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Two important examples of additive, positive, and anonymous real valued functions are
µSh(N, v) = v(N) and µBa(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N (2s − n)v(S). They induce respectively the two
families of weights defined for every n ∈ N and s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} by
ωn,sSh = ω
n,s
µSh
=
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
and ωn,sBa = ω
n,s
µBa
=
1
2n−1
. (7)
3.2 A characterization of share functions
In this subsection we focus on share functions. We start by considering three properties that a
share function might satisfy.
npp A share function ρ satisfies the Null Player Property if, for every (N, v) ∈ G+ and every
null player i ∈ N in (N, v), it holds that ρi(N, v) = 0.
sym A share function ρ satisfies Symmetry if, for every (N, v) ∈ G and every pair i, j ∈ N of
symmetric players in (N, v), it holds that ρi(N, v) = ρj(N, v).
µ-add Let µ : G → R. A share function ρ satisfies µ-Additivity if, for every pair of games
(N, v), (N,w) ∈ G, it holds that µ(N, v+w)ρ(N, v+w) = µ(N, v)ρ(N, v)+µ(N,w)ρ(N,w).
The two first properties, npp and sym, are the same as for value functions (except that
here the null player property is not required for null games), whereas µ-add generalizes the usual
additivity property for value functions. The next result shows that the above three properties
determine a unique share function and that none of the properties can be left out.
Proposition 3.3. Let µ : G → R be positive, additive, and anonymous. Then, there is a unique
share function ρµ satisfying npp, sym, and µ-add. This share function is given by
ρµi (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i ω
n,s
µ [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)]
µ(N, v)
, i ∈ N, if v 6= v0,
and ρµi (N, v0) =
1
n , i ∈ N . Moreover, the three properties are independent.
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Proof. We only prove the independence of the properties since the characterization
result holds as a direct consequence of Theorem 25 in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999),
Theorem 3.2 in Subsection 3.1 and Proposition 6.1 in the Appendix.
First, let a, b be two different and fixed players. Since µ is additive, positive, and anony-
mous, we can write
µ({a, b}, v) = λ1 · v(a) + λ1 · v(b) + λ2 · v(a, b),
for some 0 < λ1, λ2. Then we define ρ as follows:
• If N = {a, b} and (N, v) ∈ G+, then ρa(N, v) = 1µ(N,v) [λ1 · v(a) + λ2 · (v(a, b)− v(b))] ,ρb(N, v) = 1µ(N,v) [(λ1 + λ2) · v(b)] .
• If N 6= {a, b}, then ρ(N, v) = ρµ(N, v).
It is straightforward to check that ρ is a share function that satisfies npp and µ-add. However
it does not satisfy sym. To prove this last assertion, consider the game (N, v) ∈ G where
N = {a, b} and v(a) = v(b) = v(a, b) = 1. It is clear that a and b are symmetric players in
(N, v) but
µ(N, v)ρa(N, v) = λ1 6= λ1 + λ2 = µ(N, v)ρb(N, v).
Second, let µ : G → R and µ′ : G → R, µ 6= µ′ be two positive, additive, and anonymous
functions. Then, from the uniqueness of the characterization result, ρµ
′
satisfies npp and sym
but not µ-add.
Third, let ρ be defined for every (N, v) ∈ G and every i ∈ N by ρi(N, v) = 1/n. Then,
for any additive µ, ρ satisfies µ-add and sym but not npp. 
Note that the expression of ρµ given in Proposition 3.3 implies that all shares are nonneg-
ative for any monotone game. It should also be noticed that Theorem 3.5 in van der Laan and
van den Brink (1998) proves an even stronger result for a fixed player set.4 Given a µ-function
that is positive and anonymous, it is there shown that the characterization result for share func-
tions holds if and only if µ is additive. This fact supports the need to consider µ-functions that
not only are positive and anonymous – properties that are very standard – but also additive.
Note also that, when µ = µSh, the unique share function satisfying the corresponding properties
is ρSh, whereas when µ = µBa, it is ρBa. Lastly, observe that µSh-add is the additivity property
used by Shapley (1953).
4As mentioned in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999), these results hold under symmetry of µ.
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4 Games with levels structure of cooperation
In the model analyzed so far cooperation among agents was not limited. In the rest of the
paper a restriction to the cooperation is introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on
the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one. The worths of each coalition
together with the sequence of partitions are now the available data.
Let N be a finite set of players. For some integer k ≥ 0, Winter (1989) introduced a
k-level structure of cooperation over N being a sequence of partitions of N , B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}
such that B0 = {{i} : i ∈ N}, Bk+1 = {N}, and, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, Br+1 is coarser than
Br. That is to say, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} and each S ∈ Br, there is B ⊆ Br−1 such that
S = ∪U∈B U . Each S ∈ Br is called a union and Br is called the r-th level of B. The levels
B0 and Bk+1 are added for notational convenience. We denote by B0 the trivial levels structure
with k = 0, i.e., B0 = {B0, B1} with B0 = {{i}}i∈N and B1 = {N}. We further denote by
L(N) the set of all levels structures of cooperation over the set N .
Example 4.1. Take N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Then B ∈ L(N) given by B0 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}},
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}}, B2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}} and B3 = {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}} is a 2-level structure
of cooperation over N .
A game with levels structure of cooperation is a triple (N, v,B), where (N, v) ∈ G and
B ∈ L(N). We denote by GL the set of all games with levels structure of cooperation. Notice
that a game with the trivial levels structure B0 corresponds to a standard transferable utility
game and that a game with 1-level structure of cooperation B = {B0, B1, B2} corresponds to a
game with coalition structure as introduced in Aumann and Drèze (1974), also known as game
with a priori unions in Owen (1977).
On the one hand, given (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k}
we define the rth- union level game (Br, vr, Br) ∈ GL induced from (N, v,B) as the game
with k − r levels structure of cooperation with the elements of Br as players, characteristic
function vr given by vr(S) = v(
⋃
U∈S U) for any coalition S ⊆ Br, and with levels structure
Br = {Br0 , . . . , Brk−r+1} given by Br0 = {{U} : U ∈ Br}, Brs = {{U ∈ Br : U ⊆ U ′} : U ′ ∈ Br+s}
for s ∈ {1, . . . , k− r}, and Brk−r+1 = {{U : U ∈ Bk}}. Notice that Br = B if r = 0, whereas Bk
is the trivial levels structure B0 on the player set {U : U ∈ Bk}. Notice as well that monotonicity
of (N, v) implies monotonicity of (Br, vr).
On the other hand, given B ∈ L(N) with B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1} and i ∈ N , let (N,B−i) ∈
L(N) be the levels structure of cooperation obtained from (N,B) by isolating player i from
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the union she belongs to at each level, i.e., B−i = {B0, B−i1 , . . . , B−ik , Bk+1}, where, for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, B−ir = {U ∈ Br : i /∈ U} ∪ {S \ i, {i}} with i ∈ S ∈ Br.
A value on GL is a map f that assigns to every game with levels structure of cooperation
(N, v,B) ∈ GL a vector f(N, v,B) ∈ RN . We recall the definition of the Shapley levels value
(Winter, 1989) for games with levels structure of cooperation. To do so we need to introduce
some further notation. For B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1} ∈ L(N), we define the sets of permutations
Ω1(B) ⊆ Ω2(B) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ωk+1(B) ⊆ Π(N) by Ωk+1(B) = Π(N) and, recursively, for r =
k, . . . , 1,
Ωr(B) = {σ ∈ Ωr+1(B) : ∀S ∈ Br,∀i, j ∈ S and l ∈ N, if σ(i) < σ(l) < σ(j) then l ∈ S}.
That is, Ωr(B) denotes the permutations of Ωr+1(B) such that the elements of each union of
Br are consecutive.
Definition 4.2. (Winter, 1989)
The Shapley levels value, ShL, assigns to any cooperative game with levels structure of cooper-
ation (N, v,B) ∈ GL, a vector in RN defined as
ShLi (N, v,B) =
1
|Ω1(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω1(B)
(v(Pσi ∪ i)− v(Pσi )), i ∈ N,
where Pσi = {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of predecessors of i with respect to σ.
4.1 A class of LS-share functions
In this section we introduce a family of share functions for games with levels structures of
cooperation. The different share functions depend only on the choice of a positive, additive and
anonymous real valued function µ : G → R. We generalize the families of share functions for
standard games (van der Laan and van den Brink, 1998) and Coalition Structure (CS)-share
functions for games with coalition structure (van den Brink and van der Laan, 2005) to games
with an arbitrary number of levels structures of cooperation.
A Levels Structure (LS)-share function is a map that assigns to every player in a game
with levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GL her share in the worth to be allocated over
the players. The class of CS-share functions introduced and characterized in van den Brink and
van der Laan (2005) is built by multiplying for each player two shares, namely the share of each
player in some ‘internal’ game within the union she belongs to, and the share of this union in
an ‘external’ game played among the unions.
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To generalize the class of CS-share functions to games with an arbitrary number of levels
structure of cooperation (N, v,B), we introduce further concepts and notation. Given a levels
structure of cooperation B ∈ L(N), for each player i ∈ N , let U ir, r ∈ {0, . . . , k + 1}, be the
sequence of sets obtained by taking U ir the element in Br that contains player i. Notice that
U i0 = {i}, U ik+1 = N and that U i0 ⊆ U i1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ U ik ⊆ U ik+1. Then, let N ir(B) = {U : U ∈
Br, U ⊆ U ir+1} be the set of all unions of the rth-level of cooperation that form the union U ir+1 of
the (r+ 1)th level of cooperation. In order to ease the notation, we write N ir when no confusion
may arise.
Example 4.3 (Continuation of Example 4.1). Let i = 4 ∈ N . Then,
U40 = {4} ⊆ U41 = {4, 5} ⊆ U42 = {3, 4, 5} ⊆ U43 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
N40 (B) = {{4}, {5}}, N41 (B) = {{3}, {4, 5}}, N42 (B) = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}}.
Following the philosophy behind the definition of the internal and external games for
games with coalition structure, given a game with k levels structure of cooperation we shall
define k+1 different games for each player. We recall that lowercase letters denote cardinalities,
and hence in particular nir = |N ir| and sr = |Sr| for every r ∈ {0, . . . k} in the definition below.
Definition 4.4. Let µ : G → R be positive, additive, and anonymous with corresponding
weights {ωn,sµ : n ∈ N, s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}}. For every (N, v,B) ∈ GL, i ∈ N , and r ∈ {0, . . . , k},
let the rth-level game of i with respect to µ, (N ir(B), vi,rµ ) ∈ G, be given, for each T ⊆ N ir, by
vi,rµ (T ) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
Sr+1⊆Nir+1
Uir+1 /∈Sr+1
ω
nik,sk
µ · · ·ωn
i
r+1,sr+1
µ · [v(Sk,r+1 ∪ T )− v(Sk,r+1)] (8)
where Sk,r+1 = Sk ∪ Sk−1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sr+1 for r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and Sk,k+1 = ∅.
Note that in the definition above we abuse notation and write v(Sk,r+1) to denote v({i ∈
U : U ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {r + 1, . . . , k}}). Further, we assume that the empty set always
belongs to the summation in eq. (8). Therefore the kth level game of any player with respect
to any µ coincides with the kth union level game, i.e., we have vi,kµ (T ) = v(
⋃
U∈T U) for all
T ⊆ N ik = {U ∈ Bk : U ⊆ N} = Bk. Moreover, it is easy to check that, when k = 1, vi,0µ and
vi,1µ correspond exactly to the internal and external (quotient) games considered by Owen (1977)
for µ = µSh and in Andjiga and Courtin (2010) for general µ; in the latter paper a minor mistake
in the internal game made in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) has been corrected. It is
as well straightforward to check that for every i ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, (N ir, vi,rµ ) ∈ G whenever
(N, v) ∈ G.
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Example 4.5 (Continuation of Example 4.3). For i = 4, r = 0 and T = {4}, we have
v4,0µ ({4}) = ω2,0µ · ω2,0µ · (v({4})− v(∅)) + ω2,0µ · ω2,1µ · (v({3, 4})− v({3}))
+ ω2,1µ · ω2,0µ · (v({1, 2, 4})− v({1, 2})) + ω2,1µ · ω2,1µ · (v({1, 2, 3, 4})− v({1, 2, 3})).
Next, in line with Theorem 3.1 in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005), a class of
LS-share functions is defined based on positive, additive, and anonymous µ-functions. Each
member of this class of LS-share functions is also denoted by ρµ and is defined as a product of
the shares in each of the rth-level games.
Definition 4.6. Let µ : G → R be positive, additive, and anonymous. Given a game with
levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GL, the µ-LS-share function, ρµ, assigns to any game
(N, v) a vector in RN defined as
ρµi (N, v,B) =
k∏
r=0
ρµUir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ ), i ∈ N,
where the share function for standard games, ρµ, is defined in Proposition 3.3.
It is easy to verify that the above definition indeed yields a LS-share function: this is
just a consequence of ρµ being a share function and the fact that, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
U ∈ Br, it holds N is = N js and vi,rµ = vj,rµ for every pair of players i, j ∈ U and s ∈ {r, ..., k}.
The next proposition shows other properties satisfied by µ-LS-share functions.
Proposition 4.7. Let µ : G → R be positive, additive, and anonymous. Then
(i) For every (N, v) ∈ G, ρµ(N, v,B0) = ρµ(N, v).
(ii) For every (N, v,B) ∈ GL such that (N, v) ∈ G+, and every null player i in (N, v),
ρµi (N, v,B) = 0.
(iii) For every (N, v,B) ∈ GL and every pair of players i, j ∈ N that are symmetric in (N, v)
such that there is some U ∈ B1 with i, j ∈ U , ρµi (N, v,B) = ρµj (N, v,B).
(iv) For every (N, v,B) ∈ GL, U ∈ Br ∈ B and r ∈ {0, . . . , k},
∑
i∈U ρ
µ
i (N, v,B) = ρ
µ
U (Br, v
r, Br).
(v) For every pair of games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ G, every levels structure of cooperation B ∈ L(N),
and every player i ∈ N ,
ρµi (N, z,B)·
k∏
r=0
µ(N ir, z
i,r
µ ) =
k∏
r=0
[
µ(N ir, v
i,r
µ )ρ
µ
Uir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ , B0) + µ(N
i
r, w
i,r
µ )ρ
µ
Uir
(N ir, w
i,r
µ , B0)
]
,
where z = v + w.
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Proof.
(i) If B0 = {B0, B1} then, for every i ∈ N , we have N i0 = {{j} : j ∈ N} and N i1 = {N}.
It trivially follows that ρµ(N, v,B0) = ρ
µ
Ui0
(N i0, v
i,0
µ ) = ρ
µ
i (N, v).
(ii) We assume k ≥ 1 since it is trivial otherwise. Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL be such that
(N, v) ∈ G+, and i ∈ N be a null player in (N, v). First of all, observe that by Definition 4.4,
(N, v) ∈ G+ implies that (N ik, vi,kµ ) ∈ G+. We next shall show that, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if
U ir is not a null player in (N ir, vi,rµ ), then (N ir−1, vi,r−1µ ) ∈ G+.
We first show it for r = k. Let U ik ∈ N ik be a non-null player in (N ik, vi,kµ ). That is, there
is S∗k ⊆ N ik \ U ik such that
vi,kµ (S
∗
k ∪ U ik)− vi,kµ (S∗k) = v(S∗k ∪ U ik)− v(S∗k) > 0. (9)
Next, we show that (N ik−1, v
i,k−1
µ ) is not a null game. Indeed, note that
vi,k−1µ (N
i
k−1) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
ω
nik,sk
µ
[
v(Sk ∪ U ik)− v(Sk)
]
> 0,
where the inequality holds since, on the one hand, each term in the above summation is nonneg-
ative because (N, v) is monotone and, on the other hand, the term associated to S∗k is positive
by eq. (9).
Now take r ∈ {1, ..., k− 1} and let U ir be a non-null player in (N ir, vi,rµ ). That is, there is
S∗r ⊆ N ir \ U ir such that
vi,rµ (S
∗
r ∪ U ir)− vi,rµ (S∗r )
=
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
Sr+1⊆Nir+1
Uir+1 /∈Sr+1
ω
nik,sk
µ · · ·ωn
i
r+1,sr+1
µ
[
v(Sk,r+1 ∪ S∗r ∪ U ir)− v(Sk,r+1 ∪ S∗r )
]
> 0.
Since (N, v) is monotone, there are S∗k ⊆ N ik \ U ik, . . . , S∗r+1 ⊆ N ir+1 \ U ir+1 such that
v(S∗k,r ∪ U ir)− v(S∗k,r) > 0, (10)
where S∗k,r = S
∗
k ∪ ...∪S∗r+1 ∪S∗r . Next, we show that (N ir−1, vi,r−1µ ) is not a null game. Indeed,
note that
vi,r−1µ (N
i
r−1) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
Sr⊆Nir
Uir /∈Sr
ω
nik,sk
µ · · ·ωn
i
r,sr
µ
[
v(Sk,r ∪ U ir)− v(Sk,r)
]
> 0,
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where, again, the inequality holds since, on the one hand, each term in the above summation is
nonnegative because (N, v) is monotone and, on the other hand, the term associated to S∗k,r is
positive by eq. (10).
Summing up, first we have seen that (N ik, v
i,k
µ ) is not a null game, and second that, for
every r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if U ir is not a null player in (N ir, vi,kµ ), then (N ir−1, vi,r−1µ ) ∈ G+. Thus, two
cases may arise,
• either there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that U ir is a null player in a non-null game (N ir, vi,rµ ),
which by npp of ρµ means that ρµUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ ) = 0,
• or, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (N ir−1, vi,r−1µ ) is not a null game. In particular (N i0, vi,0µ ) ∈ G+.
Since i is a null player in (N, v) it is also a null player in (N i0, vi,0µ ), which by npp of ρµ
means that ρµ
Ui0
(N i0, v
i,0
µ ) = 0.
In any case, we obtain ρµi (N, v,B) = 0.
(iii) Notice that, if i and j are symmetric players in (N, v) and they belong to the same
union at the first level, then U i0 and U
j
0 are symmetric in (N
i
0, v
i,0
µ ) = (N
j
0 , v
j,0
µ ) and U ir = U jr
for r ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then, using Definition 4.6 and the fact that ρµ satisfies sym,
ρµi (N, v,B) = ρ
µ
Ui0
(N i0, v
i,0
µ )
k∏
r=1
ρµUir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ ) = ρ
µ
Uj0
(N j0 , v
j,0
µ )
k∏
r=1
ρµ
Ujr
(N jr , v
j,r
µ ) = ρ
µ
j (N, v,B).
(iv) This is a consequence of ρµ being a share function and the fact that given U ∈ Br ∈ B,
for every l ∈ {r, . . . , k}, (N il , vi,lµ ) is the same game for any i ∈ U .
(v) This follows from Proposition 3.3 and the definition of ρµ since, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k}
and each i ∈ N , it holds that (v + w)i,rµ = vi,rµ + wi,rµ . 
Property (i) shows that the µ-LS-share function extends the µ-share function for games
without levels structure of cooperation. Properties (ii) and (iii) are standard and apply to every
game with levels structure of cooperation. Although only weaker versions of these two properties
are needed in the characterization results for ρµ in Section 5, it is important to point out that
their corresponding stronger versions are also satisfied by ρµ. In fact, van den Brink and van
der Laan (2005) use, for games with one level structure of cooperation, the stronger versions.
Property (iv) is a consistency property, in the sense that it requires the share of a union in the
rth- union level game to coincide with the sum of the shares of the players in that union. For
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games with coalition structure it generalizes the quotient game property stated in Owen (1977).
Lastly, property (v) is a generalized version of the µ-add for share functions and it extends
as well two µ-additivity properties introduced in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) for
CS-share functions.
4.2 The Shapley levels share function
The LS-share function associated to the Shapley levels value as given in Definition 4.2 is defined
below. Since ShL is efficient, we only need to divide the Shapley value of a player by the worth
of the grand coalition.
Definition 4.8. Given a game with levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GL, the Shapley
levels LS-share function, ρSh
L
, is a vector in RN given by,
ρSh
L
i (N, v,B) =
ShLi (N, v,B)
v(N)
, i ∈ N, if v 6= v0,
and ρSh
L
i (N, v0, B) =
k∏
r=0
1
|Nir| , i ∈ N .
In this subsection we prove that the Shapley levels LS-share function belongs to the
family of share functions introduced in Definition 4.6. In order to do so, we make use of the
characterization of the Shapley levels value by Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2011). The two
main properties of this characterization are the Level Game Property and the Level Balanced
Contributions property. The first one requires the total payoff obtained by the members of a
union in a given level be equal to the payoff obtained by the union when considering it as a
player in the corresponding level game. The second one is a reciprocity property that requires
that, when a player of a union on the highest level Bk is isolated within the level structure and
becomes a union itself of Bk, Bk−1, . . . , B1, this affects a player that is in the same union on
the lowest level B1 in the same amount as if it happens the other way around. Let us formally
introduce these two properties.
lgp A value f on GL satisfies the Level Game Property if for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL and U ∈ Br
for some r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, ∑
i∈U
fi(N, v,B) = fU (Br, v
r, Br).
lbc A value f on GL satisfies Level Balanced Contributions if for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL and
i, j ∈ U ∈ B1,
fi(N, v,B)− fi(N, v,B−j) = fj(N, v,B)− fj(N, v,B−i).
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Before proving the main result of this subsection, we first state a useful alternative
expression of the Shapley levels value.
Lemma 4.9. Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL be a game with levels structure of cooperation. Then, for each
i ∈ N ,
ShLi (N, v,B) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik\Uik
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0\Ui0
ω
nik,sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh · [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)] . (11)
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the number of levels of B ∈ L(N). The
case k = 1 is a consequence of ShL being a generalization of the Owen value. Suppose that the
Shapley levels value ShL(N, v,B′) is obtained from eq. (11) for every (N ′, v′, B′) ∈ GL with at
most k− 1 levels of cooperation, and let (N, v,B) ∈ GL be a game with k levels of cooperation.
Let i ∈ U i1 ∈ B1 be an arbitrary player. We prove that ShLi (N, v,B) is obtained from eq. (11)
for (N, v,B) by a second induction on u = |U i1|. If u = 1, we have U i1 = {i} and thus
ShLi (N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Ui1
ShLi (N, v,B) = Sh
L
{i}(B1, v
1, B1)
=
∑
Sk⊆N{i}k (B1)
U
{i}
k (B1)/∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S1⊆N{i}1 (B1)
U
{i}
1 (B1)/∈S1
ω
nik(B1),sk
Sh · · · ω
ni1(B1),s1
Sh
[
v1(Sk,1 ∪ {i})− v1(Sk,1)
]
=
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S1⊆Ni1
Ui1 /∈S1
∑
S0⊆Ni0
Ui0 /∈S0
ω
nik,sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)] ,
where the second equality follows by lgp, the third equality holds by the first induction hy-
pothesis since B1 ∈ L(B1) is a levels structure of cooperation with k − 1 levels, and the
fourth equality holds since N i0(B) \ U i0 = ∅, N ir(B1, B1) = N ir(B) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and
v1(Sk,1 ∪ {i})− v1(Sk,1) = v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0).
Now assume that ShLi (N, v,B) is obtained from eq. (11) for any (N, v,B) with k levels
of cooperation and for any i ∈ U i1 ∈ B1 where |U i1| < u. Next suppose that (N, v,B) ∈ GL is a
game with k levels of cooperation and |U i1| = u. Since ShL satisfies lgp and lbc, we have
ShLi (N, v,B) = Sh
L
Ui1
(B1, v
1, B1)−
∑
j∈Ui1\i
ShLj (N, v,B)
= ShLUi1(B1, v
1, B1)−
∑
j∈Ui1\i
[
ShLi (N, v,B)− ShLi (N, v,B−j) + ShLj (N, v,B−i)
]
,
which can be rewritten as
ShLi (N, v,B) =
1
ni0
ShLUi1(B1, v1, B1) + ∑
j∈Ui1\i
[
ShLi (N, v,B
−j)− ShLj (N, v,B−i)
] . (12)
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Observe that, according to the double induction hypothesis, ShLUi1(B1, v
1, B1), ShLi (N, v,B−j),
and ShLj (N, v,B−i), for all j ∈ U i1 \ i, can be obtained from eq. (11). Hence, for every j ∈ U i1 \ i,
it holds that
ShLi (N, v,B
−j) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik(B−j)
Uik(B
−j)/∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0(B−j)
Ui0(B
−j)/∈S0
ω
nik(B
−j),sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0(B
−j),s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− (v(Sk,0)]
=
∑
Sk⊆Nik(B−j)
{j},Uik(B−j)/∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0(B−j)
Ui0(B
−j)/∈S0
{
ω
nik(B
−j),sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0(B
−j),s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)]
+
sk + 1
nik(B
−j)− sk − 1 · ω
nik(B
−j),sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0(B
−j),s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ j ∪ i)− v(Sk,0 ∪ j)]
}
,
where the second equality is obtained by distinguishing the cases {j} /∈ Sk and {j} ∈ Sk and
noting that
ω
nik(B
−j),sk+1
Sh
ω
nik(B
−j),sk
Sh
=
sk + 1
nik(B
−j)− sk − 1 .
We point out that we have used the notation U ir(B−j) for all r ∈ {0, ..., k+1} to denote the unions
of each level that contain player i when the levels structure is B−j . Thus, U i0(B−j) = U i0 = {i}
and U ir(B−j) = U ir \j for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Also notice that N ik(B−j) = N ik \U ik∪ (U ik \j)∪{j},
N ir(B
−j) = N ir \ U ir ∪ (U ir \ j) for each r ∈ {1, . . . k − 1} and N i0(B−j) = N i0 \ j. Moreover, it
can also be checked that
ω
nik(B
−j),sk
Sh
ω
nik,sk
Sh
=
nki − sk
nki + 1
,
ω
ni0(B
−j),s0
Sh
ω
ni0,s0
Sh
=
ni0
ni0 − s0 + 1
, and
ω
nir(B
−j),sr
Sh
ω
nir,sr
Sh
= 1, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
From the above remarks we obtain
ShLi (N, v,B
−j)
=
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0
{i},{j}/∈S0
{(
nik − sk
nik + 1
· n
i
0
ni0 − s0 − 1
)
· ωnik,skSh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)]
+
(
sk + 1
nik + 1
· n
i
0
ni0 − s0 − 1
)
· ωnik,skSh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ j ∪ i)− v(Sk,0 ∪ j)]
}
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Using twice the above expression, exchanging i and j, we obtain,
ShLi (N, v,B
−j)− ShLj (N, v,B−i)
=
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0
{i},{j}/∈S0
ni0
ni0 − s0 − 1
· ωnik,skSh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0 ∪ j)] .
Then, from eq. (12), we have
ShLi (N, v,B) =
1
ni0
∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S1⊆Ni1
Ui1 /∈S1
ω
nik,sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
1,s1
Sh
·
v(Sk,1 ∪ U
i
1)− v(Sk,1) +
∑
j∈Ui1\i
∑
S0⊆Ni0
{i},{j}/∈S0
ni0
ni0 − s0 − 1
· ωni0,s0Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0 ∪ j)]
 .
Lastly, the expression of the lemma follows since, given Sk ⊆ N ik \U ik, . . . , S1 ⊆ N i1 \U i1, we have
1
ni0
[
v(Sk,1 ∪ U i1)− v(Sk,1)
]
+
∑
j∈Ui1\i
∑
S0⊆Ni0
{i},{j}/∈S0
1
ni0 − s0 − 1
· ωni0,s0Sh · [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0 ∪ j)]
=
1
ni0
[
v(Sk,1 ∪ U i1)− v(Sk,1)
]
+
∑
S0⊆Ni0\{i}
S0 6=Ni0\{i}
(ni0 − s0 − 1) ·
1
ni0 − s0 − 1
· ωni0,s0Sh · v(Sk,0 ∪ i)
−
∑
S0⊆Ni0\{i}
S0 6=∅
s0 · 1
ni0 − s0
· ωni0,s0−1Sh · v(Sk,0) =
∑
S0⊆Ni0\Ui0
ω
ni0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)] ,
where the first equality holds by observing that, given S0 ( N i0 \ {i}, the number of different
players j ∈ N i0 \ {i} such that j /∈ S0 is ni0 − s0 − 1, whereas, given ∅ 6= S0 ⊆ N i0 \ {i}, the
number of different players j ∈ N i0 \ {i} such that j ∈ S0 is s0.
We now prove that the Shapley levels LS-share function, ρSh
L
, lies within the class of
µ-LS-share functions, i.e., that there is an anonymous, positive, and additive real-valued µ such
that ρSh
L
= ρµ. Furthermore, we prove that µ = µSh and that the corresponding weights are
therefore those given in eq. (7).
Proposition 4.10. Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL be a game with levels structure of cooperation. Then
ρSh
L
(N, v,B) = ρµ
Sh
(N, v,B). (13)
Proof. Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL, i ∈ N , and µ = µSh. First of all, note that if (N, v) is a null
game the result is straightforward. Then, in the sequel we assume that (N, v) ∈ G+. If i is a
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null player in (N, v), by npp, we have ρSh
L
i (N, v,B) = 0, whereas, by (ii) of Proposition 4.7, we
have ρµ
Sh
i (N, v,B) = 0, and thus eq. (13) trivially holds. Thus, we also assume that i is not a
null player.
From the proof of (ii) in Proposition 4.7, we know that, for every r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if U ir is
not a null player in (N ir, vi,rµ ) then (N ir−1, vi,r−1µ ) is not a null game, and that (N ik, v
i,k
µ ) is not a
null game when (N, v) is not a null game either. Hence, if, for some r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, U ir is a null
player in (N ir, vi,rµ ), then this latter game is non-null.
We now consider two cases. First, suppose that, for some r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, U ir is a null player
in (N ir, vi,rµ ) ∈ G+. First, by npp we have that ρµUir (N
i
r, v
r,i
µ ) = 0 and, hence, ρ
µ
i (N, v,B) = 0.
Then, for every Sr ⊆ N ir \ U ir, we have vi,rµ (Sr ∪ U ir) = vi,rµ (Sr), which implies that U ir is a null
player also in (Br, vr). Moreover, since ShL satisfies the null player property, we obtain
ShLUir (Br, v
r, Br) = 0. (14)
Now, taking into account that (N, v) ∈ G+, we have that, for every j ∈ N , ShLj (N, v,B) ≥ 0.
Thus, from eq. (14) and the fact that ShL satisfies lgp, we obtain that ShLi (N, v,B) = 0 and,
hence, ρSh
L
i (N, v,B) = 0, which completes the proof for this case.
Second, assume that for every r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, (N ir, vr,iµ ) ∈ G+. Using Definition 4.6 and
Proposition 3.3, it is enough to check that
ρSh
L
i (N, v,B) =
k∏
r=0
ShUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ )
vi,rµ (N ir)
.
First, note that by Definitions 2.1 and 4.4, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1},
ShUir+1(N
i
r+1, v
i,r+1
µ ) = v
i,r
µ (N
i
r). (15)
Second, using Lemma 4.9, we have
ShLi (N, v,B) =
∑
Sk⊆Nik\Uik
· · ·
∑
S0⊆Ni0\Ui0
ω
nik,sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
0,s0
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)]
=
∑
S0⊆Ni0
Ui0 /∈S0
ω
ni0,s0
Sh

∑
Sk⊆Nik
Uik /∈Sk
· · ·
∑
S1⊆Ni1
Ui1 /∈S1
ω
nik,sk
Sh · · ·ωn
i
1,s1
Sh [v(Sk,0 ∪ i)− v(Sk,0)]

= Shi(N
i
0, v
i,0
µ ) = ShUi0(N
i
0, v
i,0
µ ), (16)
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where the penultimate equality holds by Definition 4.4. Finally,
ρSh
L
i (N, v,B) =
ShLi (N, v,B)
v(N)
=
ShLi (N, v,B)
v(N)
k−1∏
r=0
vi,rµ (N
i
r)
vi,rµ (N ir)
=
ShLi (N, v,B)
v(N)
k−1∏
r=0
ShUir+1(N
i
r+1, v
i,r+1
µ )
vi,rµ (N ir)
=
ShLi (N, v,B)
v(N)
k−1∏
r=1
ShUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ )
vi,rµ (N ir)
ShUik(N
i
k, v
i,k
µ )
vi,0µ (N i0)
=
ShUi0(N
i
0, v
i,0
µ )
vi,0µ (N i0)
k−1∏
r=1
ShUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ )
vi,rµ (N ir)
ShUik(N
i
k, v
i,k
µ )
vi,kµ (N ik)
=
k∏
r=0
ρShUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ ),
where the third equality holds by eq. (15), the fifth equality holds by eq. (16) and the fact that
vi,kµ (N
i
k) = v(N), and the last equality holds by the definition of ρ
Sh.
In Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2011) a generalization of the Banzhaf value is introduced
and characterized for games with levels structure of cooperation. This Banzhaf value generalizes
the Owen-Banzhaf value given in Owen (1981) for games with coalition structure. From van
der Laan and van den Brink (2002) it follows that the corresponding share function does not
belong to their class of CS-share functions. Therefore, the share function corresponding to the
Banzhaf levels value of Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2011) does not belong to the class of LS-share
functions defined in this section. In particular it does not satisfy the multiplication property,
that we introduce in the next section.
5 Characterization of the class of LS-share functions
The characterization of a share function consists of finding a minimal set of properties that
uniquely determine it. In many situations characterizing a share function is more appealing
than just giving an explicit formula or procedure to calculate it. In this section we propose
sets of properties that characterize the class of µ-LS-share functions. We consider two types of
properties. Properties of the first type apply only to games with the trivial levels structure of
cooperation, whereas properties of the second type involve games with arbitrary levels structures
of cooperation.
The following properties of the first type are standard in the literature for games without
restrictions on the cooperation possibilities and are based on npp, sym and µ-add properties
defined in Section 3.2.
npp0 A LS-share function ρ satisfies the null player property for trivial levels structures of
cooperation if, for every (N, v,B0) ∈ GL with v 6= v0 and every null player i ∈ N in (N, v),
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ρi(N, v,B0) = 0.
sym0 A LS-share function ρ satisfies symmetry for trivial levels structures of cooperation if, for
every (N, v,B0) ∈ GL and every pair i, j ∈ N of symmetric players in (N, v),
ρi(N, v,B0) = ρj(N, v,B0).
µ-add0 Let µ : G → R. A LS-share function ρ satisfies µ-additivity for trivial levels structures
of cooperation if, for every pair (N, v,B0), (N,w,B0) ∈ GL,
µ(N, v + w)ρ(N, v + w,B0) = µ(N, v)ρ(N, v,B0) + µ(N,w)ρ(N,w,B0).
Next, we consider properties of the second type, which apply to arbitrary games with
levels structure of cooperation.
µ-mul Let µ : G → R. A LS-share function, ρ, satisfies µ-multiplication if for every (N, v,B) ∈
GL and i ∈ N ,
ρi(N, v,B) =
∏k
r=0 ρUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ , B0).
µ-addL Let µ : G → R. A LS-share function ρ satisfies µ-additivity for arbitrary levels structures
of cooperation if for every pair of games (N, v,B), (N,w,B) ∈ GL, and every player i ∈ N ,
ρi(N, v + w,B) ·
k∏
r=0
µ(N ir, (v + w)
i,r
µ )
=
k∏
r=0
[
µ(N ir, v
i,r
µ )ρUir (N
i
r, v
i,r
µ , B0) + µ(N
i
r, w
i,r
µ )ρUir (N
i
r, w
i,r
µ , B0)
]
.
con A LS-share function ρ satisfies consistency5 if, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL and every U ∈ Br
for some r ∈ {1, · · · , k},
∑
i∈U ρi(N, v,B) = ρU (Br, v
r, Br).
µ-fair Let µ : G → R. A LS-share function ρ satisfies µ-fairness if, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL
and every union of the first level, U ∈ B1, there is a scalar KµU,(B1,v1,B1) ∈ R+ such that,
for every i, j ∈ U ,
5We would like to mention that the term “consistency” has also been applied in the literature to other
properties, for instance the reduced game consistency property. Also observe that the property mimics the
requirements in Level Game Property, but it applies to share functions instead of values.
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ρi(N, v,B)− ρj(N, v,B) = KµU,(B1,v1,B1)
[
ρi(U, v
i,0
µ , B0)− ρj(U, vj,0µ , B0)
]
.
Property µ-mul implies that the share of a player in a game with levels structure of
cooperation is obtained by sequentially multiplying her share in the lowest level game with
the share of the union she belongs to on the first level in the second level game, and so on
and so forth. It generalizes a principle mentioned by Owen (1977) when introducing his Owen
value for games with coalition structures and used by van den Brink and van der Laan (2005)
to characterize a class of CS-share functions. By Definition 4.6 it is obvious that µ-LS-share
functions satisfy this property, but here we state it as an explicit axiom that a solution for games
with levels structure of cooperation (in terms of share functions) should satisfy. Similarly, con is
based on a property that is introduced by Owen (1977) as a desirable requirement for a solution
for games with coalition structure, and is satisfied by the class of CS-share functions according
to van den Brink and van der Laan (2005). It states that the sum of the shares of the players
in a union at any level r equals the share of this union in the game between the unions on
this level in the game (Br, vr, Br). It is obvious from Proposition 4.7.(iv) that all µ-LS-share
functions satisfy this property. By Proposition 4.7.(v), the µ-LS-share functions satisfy µ-addL,
which again generalizes two properties considered in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) for
games with coalition structure. Finally, µ-fair is a new axiom for games with levels structure
of cooperation. It has some similarity with fairness or the equal gain/loss principle that can be
found in various parts of the game theory literature. However, in this case we do not change
the game or structure (which is usual in such fairness axioms), but we compare the difference
between the shares of two players who are symmetric in the structure (but not necessarily in
the game) with the difference between their shares in the game vi,0µ on the zero level, where
the constant only depends on µ and the first level game. We now state and prove the first
characterization result.
Theorem 5.1. Let µ : G → R be additive, positive, and anonymous. Then, ρµ is the unique LS-
share function on GL that satisfies npp0, sym0, µ-add0, and µ-mul. Moreover, the properties
are independent.
Proof. It has been shown in Proposition 4.7 that ρµ satisfies the four properties (notice
that µ-addL implies µ-add0). Thus we only need to check that ρµ is the unique LS-share
function satisfying the properties.
Let ρ be a LS-share function satisfying the properties. For games with trivial levels
structures of cooperation ρ is characterized in Proposition 3.3 as the unique share function that
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satisfies npp0, sym0, and µ-add0. Then, µ-mul relates the share of any player in any game
with levels structure of cooperation to shares of players in games with the trivial levels structure
of cooperation. Hence, by µ-mul and the uniqueness for trivial levels structures, ρ is unique.
Finally, we show that the properties are independent by means of the following examples.
(i) The LS-share function ρ1 defined, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL, by ρ1(N, v,B) = ρµ(N, v)
satisfies npp0, sym0, and µ-add0 but not µ-mul.
(ii) The LS-share function ρ2 defined, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL by ρ2(N, v,B) = ∏kr=1 1|Nir| ,
satisfies sym0, µ-add0, and µ-mul but not npp0.
(iii) Let a and b be two different and fixed players and N = {a, b}. We know that there are
λ1, λ2 > 0 such that µ(N, v) = λ1v(a) + λ1v(b) + λ2v(N). Then, define the LS-share
function ρ3, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL, as
– If N = {a, b}, B = B0, and (N, v) ∈ G+, ρ3a(N, v,B) = 1µ(N,v) [λ1v(a) + λ2(v(N)− v(b))]ρ3b(N, v,B) = 1µ(N,v) (λ1 + λ2)v(b)
– If B = B0 and N 6= {a, b}, ρ3(N, v,B) = ρµ(N, v).
– If B 6= B0 for every i ∈ N , ρ3i (N, v,B) =
∏k
r=0 ρ
3
Uir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ , B0).
Then, ρ3 satisfies npp0, µ-add0, and µ-mul but not sym0.
(iv) Let µ0 : G → R be additive, positive, anonymous, and different from µ. The LS-share
function ρ4 defined, for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL and i ∈ N , by
ρ4i (N, v,B) =
k∏
r=0
ρµ
0
Uir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ ),
satisfies sym0, npp0, and µ-mul but not µ-add0.

Theorem 5.1 upgrades Theorems 4.5 and 4.8 in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005)
in two ways. First, it extends the two characterization results from Coalition Structure (being a
levels structure with k = 1) share functions to LS-share functions. Second, it replaces for both
characterizations three of the axioms by weaker versions by requiring them only for trivial levels
structures.
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Obviously, µ-addL implies µ-add0, which can be seen by taking B = B0. Moreover,
µ-addL implies µ-mul, which can be seen by taking w = v0. From Proposition 4.7.(v) it follows
that every LS-share function ρµ satisfies µ-addL. Therefore, Theorem 5.1 yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Let µ : G → R be additive, positive, and anonymous. Then, the function ρµ is
the unique LS-share function that satisfies npp0, sym0, and µ-addL. Moreover, the properties
are independent.
Using the LS-share functions considered in the proof of Theorem 5.1 it can be shown
that the properties considered in Corollary 5.2 are also independent. Indeed, the share function
ρ1 satisfies npp0 and sym0 but not µ-addL, the share function ρ2 satisfies sym0 and µ-addL
but not npp0, and the share function ρ3 satisfies npp0 and µ-addL but not sym0. Corollary 5.2
upgrades Theorem 5.3 in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) in two ways by first extending
the characterization result of the LS-share function from one-level structures to an arbitrary
number of levels structures of cooperation, and second by replacing two of the axioms by weaker
versions that apply only to trivial structures. Moreover, it shows that the consistency property
used in van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) can be dropped without changing the result.
Finally, we give a characterization of ρµ by using the con and µ-fair axioms.
Theorem 5.3. Let µ : G → R be additive, positive and anonymous. Then, ρµ is the unique LS-
share function that satisfies npp0, sym0, µ-add0, con, and µ-fair. Moreover, the properties
are independent.
Proof. It has been shown in Proposition 4.7 that ρµ satisfies the first four properties.
By definition of ρµ we have that
ρi(N, v,B) =
k∏
r=0
ρµUir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ , B0) = ρ
µ
Ui0
(N i0, v
i,0
µ , B0) ·
k∏
r=1
ρµUir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ , B0)
Now, for some U ∈ B1, let i, j be two players in U . Then U i0 = {i}, U j0 = {j}, N i0 = N j0 = U , and
U ir = U
j
r , N ir = N jr and vi,rµ = vj,rµ for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}. From substituting this in the equation
above for players i and j respectively, and the fact that
∏k
r=1 ρ
µ
Uir
(N ir, v
i,r
µ , B0) = ρ
µ
U (B1, v
1, B1),
it follows that ρµ satisfies µ-fair.
In order to prove uniqueness, suppose that ρ1 and ρ2 are two LS-share functions satisfying
the properties. We show that for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL, ρ1(N, v,B) = ρ2(N, v,B) by induction
on the number of levels k. If k = 0, then B = B0. In this case, by npp0, sym0, and µ-
add0, from Proposition 3.3 we have that ρ1(N, v,B) = ρ2(N, v,B) = ρµ(N, v). Next, assume
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that ρ1(N ′, v′, B′) = ρ2(N ′, v′, B′) for every (N ′, v′, B′) ∈ GL with at most k − 1 levels of
cooperation, and let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with k levels of cooperation. Let also U ∈ B1. On the
one hand, if |U | = 1 then for the only player i ∈ U we have that ρi(N, v,B) = ρU (B1, v1, B1)
has been determined uniquely by the induction hypotheses. On the other hand, if |U | ≥ 2, let
i be one of the players of U . Then, for every other player j in U , by µ-fair there is a scalar
KµU,(B1,v1,B1) ∈ R+ such that,
ρ1i (N, v,B)− ρ1j (N, v,B) = KµU,(B1,v1,B1)
[
ρ1i (U, v
i,0
µ , B0)− ρ1j (U, vj,0µ , B0)
]
= KµU,(B1,v1,B1)
[
ρ2i (U, v
i,0
µ , B0)− ρ2j (U, vj,0µ , B0)
]
= ρ2i (N, v,B)− ρ2j (N, v,B),
(17)
where the second equality is a consequence of the uniqueness for games with trivial levels struc-
ture of cooperation. Next, for the given player i, adding up eq. (17) for every j ∈ U , including
i, we obtain
|U i1|ρ1i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈Ui1
ρ1j (N, v,B) = |U i1|ρ2i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈Ui1
ρ2j (N, v,B). (18)
By con it follows that∑
j∈Ui1
ρ1(N, v,B) = ρ1Ui1
(B1, v
1, B1) = ρ
2
Ui1
(B1, v
1, B1) =
∑
j∈Ui1
ρ2(N, v,B),
where the second equality is due to the induction hypothesis, since |B1| = k − 1. This last
equation together with eq. (18) concludes the proof that ρ is uniquely determined.
Finally, we show the independence of the properties. Indeed,
(i) The LS-share function, ρ2, defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 satisfies sym0, µ-add0,
con, and µ-fair but not npp0.
(ii) The LS-share function, ρ3, defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 satisfies npp0, µ-add0,
con, and µ-fair but not sym0.
(iii) The LS-share function, ρ4, defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 satisfies npp0, sym0,
con, and µ-fair but not µ-add0.
(iv) Let ρ5 be the LS-share function defined for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL as follows:
– If B = B0,
ρ5(N, v,B) = ρµ(N, v).
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– Otherwise, for every i ∈ N
ρ5i (N, v,B) = ρ
µ
Ui1
(B1, v
1, B1) · 1|U i1|
.
Then ρ5 satisfies npp0, sym0, µ-add0, and µ-fair but not con.
(v) Let ρ6 be the LS-share function defined for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL as follows:
– If B = B0,
ρ6(N, v,B) = ρµ(N, v).
– If N is a set of indivisible players, that is for every i ∈ N there are no players
i1, . . . , il ∈ N ′ such that i = {i1, . . . , il}. For every U ∈ B1 let iU ∈ U be a randomly
selected particular agent, then ρ6iU (N, v,B) = ρ
µ
U (B1, v
1, B1)
ρ6i (N, v,B) = 0 for every i ∈ U \ iU
– Otherwise,
ρ6i (N, v,B) = ρ
µ
i (N, v,B).
Then ρ6 satisfies npp0, sym0, µ-add0, and con but not µ-fair.

It is worth noting that when we consider µSh, Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 and Corollary 5.2,
together with Proposition 4.10, provide us with three different characterization results of the
Shapley levels share function ρSh
L
.
6 Appendix
Proposition 6.1. A mapping µ : G → R is symmetric if and only if it is anonymous.
Proof. On the one hand, let µ : G → R be anonymous. Let also i, j ∈ N be two
symmetric players in (N, v) ∈ G and S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Consider the permutation pi ∈ Π(N) that
leaves any player in N \{i, j} invariant and exchanges player i with player j, i.e., pi(i) = j,pi(j) =
i, and pi(k) = k for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}. This type of permutations are known as transpositions.
We denote the set of all transpositions over N by Π∗(N). Then, since µ is anonymous,
µ(S ∪ i, v|S∪i) = µ(pi(S ∪ i), (pi−1v)|pi(S∪i)). (19)
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By definition, for every T ⊆ pi(S ∪ i) = S ∪ j,
(pi−1v)(T ) = v(pi−1(T )) =
v((T \ j) ∪ i) if j ∈ T,v(T ) if j /∈ T,
which, means that (pi(S∪i), (pi−1v)|pi(S∪i)) = (S∪j, v|S∪j) because i and j are symmetric players
in (N, v). Therefore, by eq. (19), µ is symmetric.
On the other hand, let µ : G → R be symmetric. Let also pi ∈ Π(N). Since it is otherwise
straightforward, we assume that |N | ≥ 2 and pi is not the identity permutation, that is, the
permutation that leaves every player invariant. It is well known that any such permutation can
be written as a finite composition of transpositions, i.e., there are pi1, . . . , pir ∈ Π∗(N) such that
pi = pi1 ◦ · · · ◦ pir.
We claim that for every (N, v) ∈ G, pi ∈ Π∗(N), and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N ,
µ(S, v|S) = µ(pi(S), (pi−1v)|pi(S)). (20)
Observe that if eq. (20) holds then µ is anonymous. Indeed, let (N, v) ∈ G, pi ∈ Π(N), and
∅ 6= S ⊆ N . Let also pi = pi1 ◦ · · · ◦ pir be a decomposition of pi in transpositions. Then,
µ(S, v|S) = µ(pir(S), (pi−1r v)|pir(S)) = µ(pir−1(pir(S)), (pi
−1
r−1(pi
−1
r v))|pir−1(pir(S)))
= · · · = µ(pi1(· · · (pir(S)) · · · ), (pi−11 (· · · (pi−1r v) · · · ))|pi1(···(pir(S))··· ))
= µ
(
(pi1 ◦ · · · ◦ pir)(S), ((pi1 ◦ · · · ◦ pir)−1v)|pi1◦···◦pir(S)
)
= µ(pi(S), (pi−1v)|pi(S)).
Hence, it only remains to prove eq. (20). Let pi ∈ Π∗(N) be a transposition that
exchanges i with j for some i, j ∈ N and let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: S ∩ {i, j} = ∅.
Since pi|S is the identity permutation, eq. (20) is trivially satisfied.
Case 2: ∅ 6= S ∩ {i, j} ( {i, j}.
Observe that it is equivalent to say that S \ pi(S) 6= ∅ and pi(S) \ S 6= ∅. We assume
without loss of generality that S ∩ {i, j} = {i}. Then consider the game (N ′, v′), defined by
N ′ = S ∪ j and for every T ⊆ N ′, by
v′(T ) =
v((T \ j) ∪ i) if j ∈ T, i /∈ T,v(T ) if j /∈ T.
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By construction, i and j are symmetric players in (N ′, v′). Let S′ = S \ i. Then, by symmetry,
µ(S, v|S) = µ(S′ ∪ i, v′|S′∪i) = µ(S′ ∪ j, v′|S′∪j) = µ(pi(S), (pi−1v)|pi(S)).
Case 3: {i, j} ⊆ S.
Observe that in this case we have pi(S) = S. Let k /∈ N be an extra (fictitious) player.
Then, define the game (N ′, v′) where N ′ = N ∪ k and v′(T ) = v(T \ k) for all T ⊆ N ′. Let also
pii,k ∈ Π∗(N ′) be the transposition that exchanges i with k and leaves the remaining players
invariant. Similarly, let pij,i, pij,k ∈ Π∗(N ′) be the transpositions that exchange j with i and j
with k, respectively. It is an easy exercise to check that pi = pij,k ◦ pij,i ◦ pii,k. Let T = S \ {i, j}
and define
S0 = T ∪ {i, j} = S,
S1 = pii,k(S
0) = pii,k(T ∪ {i, j}) = T ∪ {k, j},
S2 = pij,i(S
1) = (pij,i ◦ pii,k)(T ∪ {i, j}) = T ∪ {k, i},
S3 = pij,k(S
2) = (pij,k ◦ pij,i ◦ pii,k)(T ∪ {i, j}) = T ∪ {i, j} = S.
Observe that S0 \ pii,k(S0) 6= ∅ and pii,k(S0) \ S0 6= ∅. Hence, by Case 2,
µ(S0, v|S0) = µ(pii,k(S0), (pi
−1
i,k v)|pii,k(S0)). (21)
Analogously, since S1 ∩ pij,i(S1) \ ∅ and pij,i(S1) \ S1 6= ∅, we have
µ(S1, (pi−1i,k v)|S1) = µ(pij,i(S
1), (pi−1j,i (pi
−1
i,k v))|pij,i(S1)), (22)
whereas, since S2 ∩ pik,j(S2) \ ∅ and pik,j(S2) \ S2 6= ∅, we have
µ(S2, (pi−1j,i (pi
−1
i,k v))|S2) = µ(pij,k(S
2), (pi−1j,k (pi
−1
j,i (pi
−1
i,k v)))|pij,k(S2)
= µ(S3, ((pij,k ◦ pij,i ◦ pii,k)−1v)|S3 . (23)
Finally, the claim in eq. (20) follows from eq. (21), eq. (22), and eq. (23). 
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